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Introduction
Since the election of Vladimir Putin to the Russian Presidency in March 2000, Russia has violated the sovereignty of Georgia; threatened to target parts of Europe with missiles; sold arms to Iran, Sudan, and Venezuela despite U.S. objections; suspended compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty; conducted overflights of NATO countries; and resumed its armed aerial patrols. 1 Russia's aggressive foreign policy and efforts to counter U.S.
global influence imply that Moscow perceives its efforts to reclaim great power status as a zerosum game vis-à-vis the United States. Rather than expressing Russian strength exclusively through military power, Putin has adopted a "mercantilist approach" to the Russian economy and exploited European reliance on Russia's vast energy resources to divide the West and become an energy superpower. 2 Russia's domination of the European energy markets and its veto in the U.N. Security Council have given Russia incredible leverage over the West, complicating
Washington's ability to achieve its interests through consensus with its long-term allies.
Putin seeks to use this dominant position to challenge U.S. global hegemony and establish a "new architecture of global security" allowing Moscow to pursue its national interests unopposed. 3 Putin has repeatedly made calls to establish a multipolar world as a first step to confront U.S. hegemony and sought to build global support for his position through energy deals and arms sales aimed at regional balancing. 4 He has paired these actions with attempts to malign the United States in international forums, accusing it of unilateralism and an "uncontained hyper use of force… in international relations." 5 His rhetoric and recent actions reflect a complex strategy aimed at dividing the West, diminishing U.S. global influence through regional balancing and international institutions, and employing Russia's energy as an instrument of policy to establish "asymmetrical interdependence" over nations that rely on Russian energy. 6 Given Russia's assertive foreign policy, the use of its energy as an instrument of policy, and its recent military aggression in Georgia, the United States requires a flexible policy that avoids unilateral action and military confrontation while countering Russia's energy influence over U.S.
European allies and shaping Russia's behavior to meet U.S. interests.
Background
Russia derives its influence and strength from its energy wealth and its position as the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe. 7 According to the International Monetary Fund, in 2007 oil and gas represented 64 percent of Russia's total export revenue. 8 Currently Europe imports 60 percent of its gas, half of which comes from Russia. 9 The European Council, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, projects Europe's dependence on imports to grow to 84 percent by 2030, further increasing Russian influence over key U.S. allies. 10 Russia has used its energy to pursue its political agenda and to create what the EU Power Audit refers to as "asymmetric interdependence," in which Russia has employed its energy influence, predatory foreign investments, and bi-lateral deals to create a situation in which the EU needs Russia more than Russia needs the EU.
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In the winter of 2006, Russia threatened to cut off gas supplies to Georgia and had previously cut gas supplies to Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus in response to political disputes. 12 In July 2008, Ukraine notified Russia that it would not renew the lease for the Russian Black Sea fleet at the port of Sevastopol after 2017. In the winter of 2008, Russia cut off the gas to its Ukrainian pipeline. Russia cited a payment dispute and accused Ukraine of siphoning gas; 19 The U.S.
Government Accountability Office speculates that a disruption in Venezuelan supply to the U.S.
would reduce U.S. gross domestic product by $23 billion. 20 Russia has used its asymmetric interdependence with Europe to divide the EU through bilateral deals, offering nations that acquiesce to its position favorable energy prices. 21 Peterson states, "The intrinsic link between Moscow's energy and foreign policies means that not only are EU member states split between energy dependent and independent countries but between capitals willing to challenge Moscow's increasingly assertive global moves and those that calculate that an accommodating response is in their best interest." 22 Russia's strategy to "divide and rule" through economic leverage seeks to undermine both the EU's and NATO's abilities to achieve a consensus and form a common approach to confronting Russia. 23 Russia's belligerence, its veto power in the UN Security Council, and its influence over key portions of Europe have created a dilemma for the United States in its ability to counter Russian rhetoric and actions while pursuing U.S. national interests through international accord.
Russia's strategy to divide the West has further complicated U.S. efforts to avoid the pitfalls of unilateral action and gather consensus to resolve international issues such as non-proliferation and terrorism in an increasingly energy dependent world.
Policy Response
Sun Tzu stated, "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." 37 The U.S.
must approach Russia through a flexible strategy that constrains Russian aggression, avoids military confrontation, and counters Russian energy politics while fostering reciprocal economic integration under the "rule of law." 38 The goal of this strategy is to integrate Russia into the international order of responsible democracies by mitigating its influence, binding it to international laws, and encouraging domestic reform to shape Russian behavior rather than attempting to punish it through economic sanctions or military confrontation. The strategy must clearly define acceptable Russian behavior with respect to U.S. interests and international laws while establishing red lines and pre-coordinated responses to Russian transgressions. The U.S. must expand its concept of national security to encompass collective energy security to mitigate the source of Russian strength and influence. To exploit the weakness in Russia's strategy, Blank suggests the creation of a "countercartel" composed of the EU, the United States, China, Japan, India, and South Korea under the supervison of the International Energy Agency (IEA) to collectively bargain with energy producers to assure fair market prices. 45 However, Russia's influence over a significant portion of the EU and the inclusion of China and India pose significant problems. Few countries are interested in subsuming their selfinterest for that of the collective with respect to energy security. Russia's use of bi-lateral deals and attractive energy prices for acquiescent buyers could easily divide the countercartel and lead to bureaucratic paralysis as Russia prevents consensus by luring individual nations to Russia's influence through favorable energy pricing. While the full participation of the EU in this countercartel would be key to confronting Russia's influence and economic power, such a prospect is unlikely due to the lack of alternative sources, Russia's energy influence over numerous European nations, and the trans-Atlantic tensions that still persist from the Iraq war.
To solve this dilemma, the U.S. should lead efforts to create an international energy buyers' consortium composed of trusted and willing allies in Europe and other regions where Russia has attempted to expand its influence.
The goal of this consortium would be to reduce the energy and political influence of Russia over member nations by increasing their energy security, and to curtail the spread of Russia's influence to other world regions by extending the consortium's benefits to additional nations within each member's region. The U.S. should build the core of the organization from its allies in each major region of the world. Potential core members such as the UK, South Korea, and Columbia would serve as a sponsor and offer membership to other nations in their regions.
This geographic alignment would facilitate regional interconnected energy networks in which members would collectively fund projects in their area to enhance energy security and foster stability. Core members would decide on collective actions, establish policy for minimum standards and requirements for participation, and perform collective bargaining for bulk and long-term energy purchases with multiple producers for the group at reduced prices. Membership would mandate adherence to collective norms and bargaining and prohibit bilateral deals regarding energy.
Daniel Yergen contends countries must abide by the principles of diversification, resilience, integration, and rapid and accurate information to ensure energy security. 46 These core principles provide a framework for the consortium that can reduce the influence of Russia and Yergen defines resilience as "a 'security margin' in the energy supply system that provides a buffer against shocks and facilitates recovery after disruptions." 49 Membership in the consortium would require the establishment and maintenance of a minimum strategic reserve for each nation to ensure a security margin in supply. Edward Lucas argues, "Europe needs better gas storage and to link its national 'energy islands' with interconnecting pipelines and electricity lines. The result will be a gas supply system that is both physically and economically robust, and therefore much harder for an outside supplier to dominate." 50 Expanding the concept of regional energy networks to the contiguous regional members of the consortium would bolster resilience and prevent the intimidation of a single nation through threats to its supply.
Cohen recommends that the U.S. "build bridges to potential Russian allies to prevent the emergence of anti-American blocs and expand relations with key emerging markets." 51 Regional energy networks would tie into the consortium for collective bargaining and could leverage the surplus of other regions in the event of a catastrophic disruption of supply.
Yergen's final principle is information. While he defines this principle in relation to the rapid and accurate dissemination of information relating to the status of the energy market, information has a much broader application to energy security and the stability of the global energy market when used to confront actions by nations that undermine energy security and disrupt market principles. Russia's efforts to dominate both production and distribution and manipulate price through the formation of a gas cartel represent a threat to the energy security of the West that nations must confront collectively. To counter the cartel and diminish Russia's energy influence over Europe, the members of consortium must enforce and expand existing national anti-trust laws and decouple energy production and distribution in their countries.
Peterson suggests, "Transatlantic structures should work together with the International Energy Agency (which has identified gas collusion as a major threat) to develop an international anti-trust framework under which the market fixing practices of states that would make up the gas cartel could at least be named and shamed." 52 However, naming and shaming these countries will neither deter these countries from continuing their practices, if profitable, nor prevent prospective buyers from purchasing gas from these countries if it is their only option or the cheapest source. The members of the consortium must aggressively enforce their national competition laws to protect their energy markets. Further, the consortium should use the framework of the International Competition Network to pursue convergence of member nations' competition laws to establish a uniform energy anti-trust policy within the consortium. The initial goal of this effort would be to decouple the production and distribution of natural gas throughout the consortium while later efforts would focus on advocating for the demonopolization of Russia's domestic and Caspian gas pipelines and preventing the formation of a gas cartel.
Lucas contends that if Russia "depoliticized and demonopolized its own energy industry-chiefly by allowing third-party access to its gas pipeline monopoly-it could diffuse the controversy over energy security." 53 This would give foreign companies greater control over the profitability of their Russian investments, enhance integration, and return free market principles to Russian business, potentially increasing foreign investment in Russia. Blank asserts, "Russian participation under market conditions in such an arrangement would force reforms in its energy industry, and thus its government. Such reforms might then allow for foreign investment." 54 Leonard and Popescu argue that the application of anti-trust laws "could lead to the unbundling of energy companies in these states, greater transparency of their energy sectors, and as a consequence greater energy security for Europe and fewer possibilities for Russia to use energy for political purposes." 55 As these authors contend, the collective pursuit of anti-trust legislation and enforcement in Europe has the potential to diminish Moscow's hold on supply and distribution in key global markets and open Russia to greater foreign investment. However, the success of this measure depends on consensus within the EU and on each country subordinating its interests to that of the common good, which is unlikely given Russia's effective strategy of divide and rule. Therefore, the solution for the U.S. in Europe would be to extend membership in the consortium to individual nations and work with those countries that accept this offer to diminish Russia's influence and foster a more symmetrical economic integration.
By diminishing Russia's influence over key U.S. global partners through cooperation on energy security, the U.S. will have greater ability to achieve international support on issues such as counterterrorism and non-proliferation. While the primary emphasis of the consortium is to ensure the energy security of its constituents, the core members of this organization, under U.S.
leadership, can translate this economic security into political power in other areas of global concern that have been held hostage by Russian vetoes and energy influence. The consortium must form a voting bloc in international organizations to curtail Russia's energy influence, promote fair competition in energy, and achieve energy security for its members. However, the bloc could expand its agenda to encompass other issues of common importance such as nonproliferation, combating terrorism, and the security of the global commons. While these tactics will serve as an effective means to counter Russia's use of energy and international institutions to produce political leverage; without incentives for integration and a public diplomacy campaign to justify these actions to the Russian people they present an opportunity for the current Russian leadership to further solidify their hold on power and continue their assertive foreign policies. By casting the U.S. as an impediment to Russia's return as a great power and as the source of Russian problems at home and abroad, Russian leaders seek to focus public discontent on an external source while generating a strong nationalistic sentiment that allows the leadership to act without restraint both domestically and abroad. Vladimir Shlapentokh contends, "The core of the Kremlin's ideological strategy is to convince the public that any revolution in Russia will be sponsored by the United States. Putin is presented as a bulwark of Russian patriotism, as the single leader able to confront America's intervention in Russian domestic life and protect what is left of the imperial heritage." 57 Cohen suggests that the U.S. "reach out to the people of Russia through a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy via the Internet, international broadcasters, visitor programs, and exchanges to debunk the myth that the U.S. is hostile to Russia." 58 The U.S. must implement such a program to foster greater understanding and ties at the grassroots level to break the false perceptions of the U.S. as the source of Russia's problems. This will allow the population to remedy Russia's problems through political reform rather than through direct interference in Russian politics by an external source.
The U.S. must engage Moscow and integrate Russia into Western efforts to resolve issues of global concern. This will appeal to Russia's need for respect as a great power and counter its accusations of U.S. unilateralism while fostering greater ties between the two nations. Issues such as terrorism, regional instability, and non-proliferation confront both the West and Russia.
By focusing the Russian people and leadership on resolving these common issues through cooperation, Washington can remove the Russian perception of the U.S. as its principal adversary and effect change in Russian policies. The U.S. must appeal to the ego of Russian elites and approach Russia as a great power with the intent of promoting responsible cooperation on key international issues to secure Russian support. By developing and cultivating personal relationships in Russian industry and government, the U.S. can foment a change in Russian policies and practices that can outlast the political tenure of today's hard line leaders.
Conclusion
The resurgence of Russia and its determined trajectory towards great power status have re-ignited once dormant tensions between the United States and Russia. Russia's rhetoric and campaign to expand its strategic influence are indicative of a perception by Moscow that its resurgence is a zero sum game vis-à-vis the United States. Russian influence and power are the result of its asymmetric energy relationship with Europe and its position in international institutions. Russia seeks to expand this influence through regional balancing and attempts to control the supply, distribution, and pricing of a portion of the global energy market. Its intent is to counter U.S. global hegemony and to create a new multipolar world in which Russia may exercise its power without opposition. Peterson contends, "The truth about the transatlantic energy conundrum is that the Kremlin has it right. Energy policy cannot be separated from foreign policy." 59 To counter Russian efforts, the U.S. must adopt a strategy of collective energy security to secure the political and economic independence of its key allies while reaching out to create new partners in the developing world. The U.S. must translate this economic cooperation into political action to bind Russia to existing international laws and norms and prevent it from exploiting its positions in international organizations in an effort to shape its behavior. However, the United States must temper these tactics with efforts to integrate Russia into the West through information and cooperation. The U.S. must employ public diplomacy to break Russian perceptions of the U.S. as its foil and encourage political reform, while engaging Russian leadership on issues of global concern. By integrating Russia into its efforts regarding nonproliferation, terrorism, and the security of the global commons, the U.S. will appeal to Russia's need for respect as a great power and counter accusations of unilateralism.
While this strategy is by no means a panacea for resolving all of the latent issues between Russia and the United States, it does offer a way forward that brings Russia closer to the West. In sum, by countering Russia's source of influence and integrating it into the norms and responsibilities of the West, the U.S. can successfully shape Russian behavior while increasing
Washington's influence and standing in world affairs.
